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The Philippine has been
plagued by insurgencies throughout the history. Defined as
an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through the use of subversion and
armed conflict:, insurgency is said to be a form of modern
warfare. Differences in ideology and faith, problems of
underdevelopment and poverty, and social dissatisfaction are
some of the main issues that have given rise to
insurrections in the country.
The longest
running insurgencies in the country are being waged by the
Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA)
and it’s affiliate groups that are mainly based in the whole
islands and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movements
operating in Mindanao.
Through the
Government has greatly diminished the numbers and arms of
insurgent groups through successful military campaigns,
uprisings have not been completely eradicated. Both
insurgent groups continue to operate and engage in criminal
and terrorist activities that threaten the country’s
internal security and hamper nation building.
How can successful
military campaigns in history help in addressing insurgency
in the Philippines? What other strategies employed in the
past by governments, in the Philippines and abroad, can be
adopted to address the present problem of insurgency in the
country? These are the questions that this article aims to
answer. The article begins by tracing the development of
insurgency group in the Philippines, including their
ideology, cause, aims, and their means to realize those
aims. The article will examine the military strategies being
used by the present Philippine Administration in countering
contemporary insurgency problems in the country. It will
also look into the successful counterinsurgency operations
of past Philippine administrations, as well as of selected
countries and examine whether we can adopt those operations
to address our present insurgency problem.
Communist Insurgency
The communist
insurgency in the Philippine scan be traced to the peasant
rebellions during the late 19th century up to the
early 20th century. Rural revolts among peasants
became common at the time due to issues on land tenancy and
growing population pressures. The agrarian unrest continued
until the 1950s, covering mostly Central Luzon and Visayas,
which spurred the armed struggle of the combined forces of
the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, established in 1930, and
the Hukbalahap war guerillas. The rebellion declined in the
1950s but residuals of the old Huk army played significant
roles in the establishment of the New People’s Army.
Internal schism
due to ideological differences and party leadership
rivalries within the PKP resulted in the establishment of
the Communist Party of the Philippines. The organization was
founded in 1968 by Jose Maria Sison and other young
revolutionaries in Central Luzon. Like Sison, most members
of the political group were educated youths from the middle
class who were disgruntled with the government. The CPP’s
ideology was largely drawn from the Chinese communism of Mao
Zedong and its model agrarian revolution, unlike the
Soviet-oriented PKP. Sison and his cadres criticized the
subservient policy of the Philippines to the United States,
describing the country as “a semifeudal, semicolonial
society ‘ruthlessly exploited’ by United States
imperialists, the ‘comprador big bourgeoisie,’ landlords,
and bureaucratic capitalists.” Armed revolution was regarded
as the only way to overthrow the United States-sponsored
government, free the people from their oppression, and
institute a people’s democratic revolution. The party sough
to promote their ideology by using the following causes: the
land tenancy system and a peasant desire for agrarian
reform; unemployment and poor economic conditions, including
an extremely inequitable income distribution; and a lack of
government credibility due to corruption and abuses.
The CPP
encountered a main problem after its inception – it promoted
a peasant-led revolution and the party had no peasant base
and no knowledge in guerilla warfare. The problem was solved
after a few months when the party found an ally in Bernabe
Buscayno. Buscayno, better known as Kumander Dante commanded
a group of peasant guerillas, which emerged from the past
PKP-Huk actions in the late 1960s. Convinced by the party’s
ideological zeal, Buscayno submitted under the leadership of
the Party. Hence, the CPP-New People’s Army was born. The
CPP-NPA operations concentrated on the agrarian reform in
the rural areas. The group engaged in banditry, extortion
for revolutionary taxes and bombing of important
establishments in the areas, to advance their causes.
Southern Philippine
Secessionist Groups
The Muslim
secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines is rooted
in the centuries-old resistance of Muslim Filipinos against
Spanish colonization. The destruction of the traditional
patterns of authority and communal autonomy, curtailment of
individual freedom, and the introduction of a new religion
fueled the resistance of the Muslims in Mindanao. Unlike
their counterparts in Luzon and Visayas, the Muslims of
Mindanao refused to submit to Spanish authority. Such
resistance has endured to this day. Whereas the communist
party aims to overthrow the government to establish a
socialist state, Muslim secessionist groups want to cede
from the Philippines and form a separate Bangsamoro (Islamic
State).
The Muslim
separatist sentiment is caused by the following main
factors: first, Muslim fear that their religious, cultural,
and political traditions may be weakened or destroyed by
forced assimilation into a Catholic-dominated Philippine
Republic. Second, Muslims resent the influx of migrants from
Luzon and Visayas, which dispossessed them of their
ancestral and communal lands and turned them into a minority
in their own land. Third, Muslims reject the economic
underdevelopment and poverty of Mindanao. Rabasa and Chalk
notes that 15 of the Philippine’s poorest provinces are
located in the region, which also has the country’s lowest
literacy rate (75 percent) and life expectancy (57 years).
Moreover, most provinces have limited or no access to basic
social services, such as electricity and water supply,
education, and health. Fourth, is the Mindanao tradition of
warlordism, banditry, and blood feuds among ethnic groups.
The Muslim
Secessionist Movement is comprised of three groups. The (1)
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); (2) the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF); and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
The Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded by Nur Misuari, an
educated Tausug, in 1971. The MNLF believe that (1) the Moro
people constitute a distinct bangsa (nation) that has
a specific Islamic historical and cultural identity; (2) the
bangsamoro (Islamic nation) has a legitimate right to
self-determination; and (3) the MNLF has a duty and
obligation to wage a jihad against the Philippine
State. As such, the movement fought for due representation
of Muslims in the Philippine political process. In 1996,
peace talks between the Government and MNLF have resulted to
the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Development
(ZOPAD) in Mindanao; the creation of Southern Philippines
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD); and Misuari’s
election as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao, which gave the Muslims a stake in the political
process of the country. Thus, only the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf remain in the Muslim
secessionist movement at present.
The Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) is a breakaway group from the MNLF,
which left its parent organization in 1980.
Differences in the
two group’s goals paved the way for such separation. The
MILF has a more religious orientation than the MNLF. Aside
from pursuing nationalist objectives, the group also aims to
promote Islamic ideals in the country. Hashim Salamat, the
group’s leader states that their political objective is to
create a separate Islamic State encompassing provinces in
Mindanao where Muslims are majority. The Shari’a
(Islamic Law) will be observed in all aspects of life in the
said Islamic State. The MILF aims to attain such goal thru
da’wa (Islamic preaching) and jihad (holy
war). As a revolutionary military force, MILF does not
practice indiscriminate violence against civilians. Its
violent activities, mostly in the form of orthodox guerilla
warfare, are only aimed at the Philippine Military. However,
the also group uses terrorist-type tactics to extort
revolutionary taxes.
The Abu Sayyaf
Group (literally “Bearer of the Sword”), a fundamentalist
organization was founded in1989 and was originally named
Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), due to its link
with the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan. The majority of
the group’s members are Muslim youths, with many of the
older cadres reportedly veterans of the Afghan war. The Abu
Sayyaf does not only want to establish a separate Islamic
state governed by the Shari’a. The group also wants this
state to be exclusive for Muslims. The Abu Sayyaf does not
practice religious tolerance towards non-Muslims. The
activities of the group are terrorist in nature and are tied
to the integrated effort among Muslim fundamentalists in
asserting the dominance of Islam in global politics. The Abu
Sayyaf Group received international attention when they
abducted and hostaged some foreigners in Sipadan, Malaysia.
Some Strategies Employed by
the Government
The Philippine
Government has changed its strategy in countering insurgency
along with the changes of administrations over the years.
The government has employed both peaceful and military means
in its attempts to eliminate insurrection in the country.
The Aquino Administration engaged into peace talks with the
National Democratic Front, which touched on the issues of
poverty alleviation, productive employment generation,
equity and social justice, and human rights promotion. The
government proposal came under the theme “Food and Freedom,
Jobs and Justice” as the key to peace. However the peace
talks did not prosper as hostilities continued between
Philippine government and rebel groups.
Similarly, the
Ramos Government engaged the Moro National Liberation Front
in peace negotiation, as it focused on peace and security.
The talks succeeded and resulted in the establishment of the
Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) in Mindanao and
Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), which provided Muslims a stake in the country’s
political process and the right to shape the future of
Muslim Mindanao. In exchange of the MNLF’s return and
adherence to the government, an amnesty program was accorded
to the group along with a socio-economic package for
development with the assistance of United States-funded
Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program. The said
program has since provided former MNLF members a means of
livelihood and developed poverty-stricken areas in Mindanao.
Further, qualified combatants were integrated to the
AFP/PNP.
The Estrada
Administration had initially pushed peace negotiations with
the MILF, which formally started on October 29, 1999. The
peace talks’ initial aims were to re-integrate the MILF to
the mainstream society, attain lasting peace in Mindanao
through a meaningful autonomy program, and a consolidation
of peace efforts. However, said talks were aborted as the
Estrada Government implemented an all-out war engaged policy
against militant Muslims.
What has the Philippines got
to learn from other countries?
Insurgency is not
a unique experience of the Philippines. Many countries,
developed or developing, have been beset by insurrections.
However, the government of some of these countries have
already overcome or contained their local insurrections. The
following section will provide the experiences of selected
countries, which succeeded in combating local insurgencies.
The Thai Experience
Thailand has
experienced the same insurgency problems as the Philippines,
which date back to the establishment of the Communist party
of Thailand in the 1920s. Since then, communist insurgency
had been a national concern that had beset a number of Thai
Governments and dominated military and police activities for
more than twenty years. From a peek strength of about 12,000
armed insurgents in the late 1970s, the number of armed
guerillas and separatists had declined to 600 in 1987.
Observers in Thai politics downplay the importance of the
communist ideology to the local insurgency. Local
insurrections emerged out of people’s discontent with the
government, which only concentrated in the capital. The
neglect of the peripheral areas of the country has alienated
many rural inhabitants and ethnic minorities. This resulted
to the resentment that steadily grew in the 1960s and 1970s,
which communist ideologues were able to exploit. However,
the Thai government has successfully downplayed communist
insurgency in the country by the late 1980s. The government
employed “coordinated government efforts combining military
and police actions with social and economic policies”, which
effectively reduced the level of insurgency. Credit is also
due to the extensive military aid and technical assistance
that the United States had provided to the counterinsurgency
program in 1950s.
The 1970s signaled
the Thai government’s resolve to put an end to the communist
insurgency, by increasing the effectiveness of its
counterinsurgency operations. In 1974, the government
established the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC)
under the military’s Supreme Command to coordinate and
integrate the counterinsurgency efforts of various
government agencies. In the early 1980s, the government
reoriented their counterinsurgency programs to focus more on
neutralizing the communists’ tactics than simply killing the
insurgents. The said approach led to an increased
coordination among civilian, police, and military agencies.
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda took over as director of a
reorganized ISOC in 1987, indicating an increased emphasis
on the political rather than the military aspect of the
government’s counterinsurgency programs.
The government
also crafted a new policy that addressed the political and
social aspects of insurgency problem. The policy offered
amnesty to all insurgents and included measures to improve
social and economic conditions that give rise to the
insurgency. At the same time, the Thai military conducted
selective but aggressive and effective operations against
insurgent and guerilla bases in the remote mountainous
areas. The government’s approach resulted in the weakening
of the communist movements and the increased surrender of
more insurgents, which led to the elimination of insurgency
in the country.
The British Experience
The United
Kingdom’s insurgency problem in Northern Ireland can be
compared to that of the Philippines in Mindanao. The
conflict and insurgency problem in the territory has both
political and religious underpinnings. The conflict is
brought about by the continuous power struggle between the
Unionists, who would like to maintain the territory’s union
with Great Britain and Nationalists, who would like to cede
the union to establish a separate state or to reunite with
Ireland. The struggle is further exacerbated as the
religious dimension set in. Most, if not all, Unionists are
Protestants who have the monopoly of political power in the
process.
Historically,
Irish Catholics have been subjected to all kinds of
political, social and economic discrimination, as they were
perceived to be disloyal to the Crown. Catholics were not
accorded the right to suffrage until the early 20th
century. They were not allowed to run for office or hold
government position. Moreover, they were also not accorded
equal work opportunities with their Protestant counterparts.
The political and religious tensions further increased due
to lack of contact between the two conflicting groups.
When the Northern
Ireland government was not able to contain violence between
Protestants and Catholic extremist groups, Great Britain
decided to intervene in the territory in 1969, after
successfully quelling counterinsurgencies in Malaya (present
Malaysia), Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus. Great Britain’s
counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland has been
described only as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
(MACA). The said approach involved a “political/military
strategy which coordinates governmental, judicial, economic,
social and psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed
at containing, isolating and destroying identifiable
resistance.” British counterinsurgency operations has five
important elements: the identification of the enemy and its
reasons for existence; the coordination of all government
resources to eliminate the insurgency; the containment and
the tactical attrition of the enemy; the political and
military isolation and frustration of the insurgents; and
the enemy’s total destruction.
It is important to
note Britain’s emphasis on psychological warfare operations
to defeat the IRA insurgency. Kitson, Britain’s premier
military strategist, who authored the counterinsurgency
bible “Low Intensity Conflict”, believed that “it is in
men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and
decided”. Thus, British counterinsurgency strategists
concentrated on influencing and conditioning the mindset of
the people on how they saw the problem in the North. Also
part of the psychological warfare, Britain demonstrated the
full strength of the state by implementing laws and
regulations to quell the insurgency.
Through IRA has
continued to operate in the country, The British and
Northern Irish Governments were able to reach a ceasefire
agreement with the insurgency group. Moreover, the Belfast
Agreement was signed by the involved parties in 1998, which
included the devolution of autonomy to the territory, a
power-sharing scheme between the Unionist and Nationalist
parties, and the promotion of equal rights between Catholics
and Protestants. The prospect of peace in the country is
further maintained with IRA’s latest pronouncements of
decommissioning its weapons and implementation of the 1998
Belfast Agreement.
Lessons Learned
Counterinsurgencies “require an interconnecting system of
actions – political, economic, psychological, and military –
that aim at the [insurgents’ intended] overthrow of the
established authority in a country and its replacement by
another regime.” Thus far, efforts of the Philippine
Government to combat insurgencies in the country have
remained to be a partial success. While the successful
military offensives have continued to reduce the number of
insurgents over the years, said insurgent movements still
and will continue to operate in the country, until the
deep-seated factors of insurgency and terrorism are dealt
with by the government. The absence of a holistic and a
comprehensive approach by the Philippine Government in
addressing insurgency and its underlying causes continues to
be a setback in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy.
The non-continuance of the government’s counterinsurgency
policies, which tend to change along with the country’s
change of leadership, has also become an obstacle in the
total elimination of rebel groups.
Military operation
is only part of the counterinsurgency equation and only
offers a short-term solution to insurgency. The complete
eradication of insurgency will only be attained by the total
elimination of its underlying causes. As such, a
comprehensive and a holistic approach must be employed.
Since insurgencies
are primarily political in nature, the Philippine Government
must develop solutions that would address the political
grievances of insurgents.
The government
must continue its amnesty program towards the rebels and
work towards the rebels and work towards their reintegration
to the Philippine society. Justice and reconciliation must
be properly balanced. The government must encourage the
democratic participation through the proper means and
processes. Estrada’s double policy of engaging MILF
insurgents in peace talks and then waging an all-out war
against them has destroyed whatever confidence base the
government has created with the dissidents. As such, new
trust and confidence-building activities are needed to put
insurgents in the negotiation table. Moreover, the
government must also ensure to deliver whatever promise they
would make to the former dissidents.
Poverty and
underdevelopment have been pointed out as one of the main
causes of rebellion. Most analysts agree that the best way
in combating insurgency and rebellion “lies with
implementing a sustained economic development program”, as
this would not only undermine the civilian support base of
the insurgents, but also would remove both groups’ raison
d’être.
Psychological
warfare operations, which include intelligence-gathering and
propaganda play an important role in winning the war against
insurgency. The government must win the support of the rest
of the population especially those residing near the
insurgent-infested provinces so as to prevent them from
supporting the rebels. Knowledge on one’s enemy increases
the probability of defeating such enemy. The creation of an
independent government organization with the power to
coordinate military and non-military actions is crucial in
addressing the country’s communist and secessionist
insurgencies. Such organization can provide the continuity
and the consistency of the approaches and strategies that
will be used to quell insurgencies and terrorist activities.
The Philippine Government may get ideas from the strategies
that the Thai and British Governments had utilized in
solving their local insurgencies. However, the employment of
these strategies does not guarantee full success. The nature
and causes of insurgency is not static. They change as they
adapt to the new political, social, and economic
environments. Differences of the time frame and the social
and political landscapes of the country may affect the
results of implementing the said strategies, despite
seemingly striking similarities. A successful
counterinsurgency must employ approaches and strategies that
are specifically accustomed to the political, social, and
economic conditions of the Philippines.
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