Unfolding the Journey of a Transforming Army

BY: MELLIE ROSE DC SALVANERA

Serving the World-Class Way: City of Balanga Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame Case Study
BY CITY GOVERNMENT OF BALANGA

Urban Warfare in the Changing World: Philippine Army Operations in the Marawi Campaign
BY LTC ARVIN M TENORIO AND MS KATRINE MAE M BERNADAS

Strengthening the AFP through U.N. Peace Operations
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LET’S MAKE IT HAPPEN NOW: Book Review on A Sense of Urgency by John P. Kotter
BY MR JOWEE ESTEFAN P GABIANO
The Army Journal is an academic journal published bi-annually by Headquarters, Philippine Army with the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) as the office of primary responsibility. It serves as a tool to publish original research or related literature on subjects relevant to the PA or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Editorial Board ensures accuracy of the information contained herein, but does not accept responsibility for errors and omissions. The authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material that they provide. The Army Journal reserves the right to edit the materials.

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Leading change is no easy feat. Everyone knows that change is inevitable, but most abhor it for reasons such as fear of failing or the compulsion to preserve the convenience and comfort of the status quo. A lot of organizations around the world that took the huge leap towards initiating change have failed, but there are some that triumphed. This issue of the Army Journal shall explore and celebrate some of these successes as it examines how the featured organizations have attained the status of being world-class. As it delves into these victories, it shall also look into significant insights on what makes institutions fail or flourish.

The article, “Unfolding the Journey of a Transforming Army”, chronicles how the Philippine Army achieved the status of a Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Famer – the attainment of breakthrough results since the adoption of the Performance Governance System, implementation of strategy management system, and the Palladium validation process. After almost eight years of implementing the Balanced Scorecard, the 121-year old organization is now considered world-class in terms of strategy management and boasts increased overall operational readiness condition, enhanced financial performance, greater trust and satisfaction from the public, and more efficient systems and processes.

Another success story is that of the City of Balanga’s induction into the Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame. The case study features how a local government unit with low revenues and economic opportunities in 2007, evolved into a thriving and up and coming University Town in the Asia Pacific. Its success is mainly attributed to changed culture in the organization and greater involvement and participation of its employees and citizenry.

However, the road to success is not without any challenges. The same is true for the longest urban skirmish in the Philippines’ recent history, the Battle of Marawi. The study entitled “Urban Warfare in the Changing World: Philippine Army Operations in the Marawi Campaign”, which was written by LTC ARVIN M TENORIO (INF) PA and Ms Katrine Mae M Bernadas, evaluates the Philippine Army’s performance during this 5-month campaign and determines its effects on the current and future capability of the organization. It also identifies major issues encountered and how these were dealt with by the organization, and various strategic, operational and tactical lessons that should be taken into account when dealing with similar circumstances.

Similarly, the article “Strengthening the Armed Forces of the Philippines through Participation in U.N. Peace Operations” by Ms Karlota S Jamoralin and Pamela Chelsea M Ortiz explores the tactical and strategic benefits yielded from participation in United Nations peace operations. The authors enumerated substantial gains from such endeavor, which include enhanced individual skills of AFP personnel, benchmarking with organizational best practices, and strengthening of relations with other Armed Forces.

Mr Jowee Estefan P Gabiano’s review of Kotter’s “Sense of Urgency” emphasized how a culture of urgency takes time and effort, which is very much needed in the Philippine Army and in its road to transformation. He also highlighted the crises that may arise in the path towards change, and how it can be taken as opportunity for further development. Moreover, he stressed the meaning of the concept of true urgency and how it can be integrated in communicating the need for change in the Philippine Army.

Creating a sense of urgency is the first step towards leading change. Successful institutions showcased in this Army Journal issue have not only hurdled this stage, but also went far beyond the initial stride. That’s what sets them apart from the rest and therefore makes them world-class.
INTRODUCTION

About eight years ago, the Philippine Army’s credibility was tainted by all the issues and allegations thrown upon them. With the will and perseverance to refine the organization’s image, the PA established the “case for change”. This change seeks to meet the people’s expectations, synchronize systems and processes, achieve organizational cohesion, and lastly, to be at par with the world’s best armies.
THE ROAD TOWARDS TRANSFORMATION

Instead of being disheartened by the issues that challenged the stability of the organization, the Philippine Army took this opportunity to better themselves. This paved way to the development of the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR), the Philippine Army’s 18-year transformation program that highlights the commitment of the Philippine Army to pursue genuine reforms founded on good governance and performance excellence.

The ATR is patterned after the Performance Governance System (PGS) Pathway, which is a local adaptation to the Palladium Balanced Scorecard of the Harvard Business School.

This long-term program is composed of three basecamps which seeks to develop disciplined and motivated soldiers capable of addressing internal security threats by 2013, well-equipped Army that has established a respectable image in Southeast Asia by 2016, and being a modern and respected Army in Asia, before accomplishing its vision of becoming world-class Army that is a source of national pride by 2028.

In pursuit of becoming “a world-class Army that is a source of national pride by the year 2028”, the Philippine Army has improved their systems and processes by developing a solid strategy that seeks to create a credible, reliable, responsive, more capable and more professional Army committed to its mandate of serving the people and securing the land. To make the strategy successful, they have ensured that their strategy execution mechanisms were aligned to the thrust of the PA strategy. Starting with the development of the performance scorecards; followed by the alignment of budget to the strategy; then, created the Multi-Sector Advisory Board, whose representation covers the media, the academe, the Philippine Congress, the Civil Society/NGO, serving as our sincere critic, strong advocate, and staunch watchdog.

It follows a 4-stage certification process composed of Initiated, Compliant, Proficient, and Institutionalized Stages, wherein each stage requires a set of hallmarks that demonstrates advancement in strategy...
With all the efforts done to become exemplar of reform, the Philippine Army has attained the PGS Institutionalized status on October 2014 and later on, recognized as one of the twelve government institutions that were awarded as Islands of Good Governance or IGG during the APEC Senior Leader’s Luncheon last October 2015.

Despite these achievements, the Philippine Army does not stop their commitment in improving their strategy and sustaining their efforts to become a more resilient and globally competitive force provider. After about seven years of practicing good governance through strategy execution, the Philippine Army raised their bar and bid to the Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame.

**WHAT IS PALLADIUM BALANCED SCORECARD HALL OF FAME?**

The Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame for executing strategy publicly recognizes organizations that have successfully executed their strategies and achieved breakthrough results through the use of Kaplan and Norton’s Strategy Management System. Having inducted more than 200 organizations world-wide since its establishment in 2000, this recognizing body is regarded as the gold standard for strategic performance management.
THE PROCESS

The Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame application process includes three stages: Apply, Evaluate, and Award.

For the application stage, the organization needs to fill out the complete Hall of Fame application and release forms, and submit the same along with the application fee. Then, if the application passes through the screening process, Palladium will contact the organization to start the evaluation portion of the process, which involves a best practices survey, submission of additional supporting information, on-site visit, and interviews with key executives. Then, the evaluation findings and recommendations will be presented through an exit briefing.

Lastly, the third stage will commence once the award committee concludes that the organization successfully passed the evaluation. The organization will be admitted into the Hall of Fame and awarded the Hall of Fame and receive the award during the Palladium Summit.

BREAKTHROUGHS FROM THE STRATEGY

For its bid for the Palladium Hall of Fame, the PA offered six (6) breakthrough results from its Performance Scorecard covering the mission, financial, customer, internal processes, human resources, and information technology of the organization.

On mission, the PA has become more proficient in accomplishing its mandate as it was able to raise its capability with improved overall operational readiness. Dramatic increase was likewise felt in the areas of training and maintenance.
The Army has also made significant progress in financial performance as it raised its cash utilization rate or the degree of efficiency of the Army’s fiscal operations. Worth noting is an increase in the rating of its absorptive capacity or the ability of the organization to obligate and utilize the programmed funds.

To check the effectiveness of its Stakeholder Engagement Program and validate the organization’s positive impact to its external stakeholders, the Army commissioned Club Media Asia, a third party independent survey firm, which resulted to a Plus (+) 75 Net Trust Rating and Plus (+) 73 Net Satisfaction Rating. Likewise it validates the professionalism of the Army in serving the people and securing the land.
On *internal process* perspective, the Army also attained breakthrough performance in the conduct of combined arms exercises by Infantry Divisions which translate to effective combat operations. Its stakeholders also enjoy more efficient frontline services with the certification of our four (4) processes to the standards ISO 9001 Quality Management System.

The *Human Resource* perspective is considered as key pillar in any organization, and the PA’s personnel satisfaction index was close to the highest possible rating of 4.0 as its benchmark. Complimentary to this is the 98% personal scorecard rating which is a clear indication that the governance culture has been successfully brought down to the individual soldier.
On Information Technology, with 100% of its infantry divisions having operational voice and data systems integration, this provides picture as to how far the PA is in connecting its units and offices towards efficient data integration and knowledge management. Lastly, a total of 237 Army units are now connected to the Civil-Military Operations Management Information Systems, a web-based system that manages information through automated civil-military transactions and centralized storage and retrieval and collection of data.

Through these gains, the Philippine Army was able to perform their processes more effectively and efficiently. Taking a leap forward in achieving this vision, the Philippine Army bids to the Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame last September 2017. This initiative embarks another journey of becoming “world-class” for the Philippine Army and its nation.

**EVALUATING ARMY’S STRATEGY**

After successfully accomplishing all the necessary requirements during the application stage, the Philippine Army received a notice for on-site evaluation from the Palladium group.

With no time to waste, the PA, with the efforts of the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO), launched an Army-wide Advocacy Campaign and prepared all the necessary documents that will be checked during the on-site evaluation.
On 22 January 2018, Mr. David McMillan, the Director of the Office of Strategy Management of the Palladium Group, visited the Philippine Army to commence his three-day evaluation activity. Moreover, his visit seeks to check and validate our strategy execution mechanisms and breakthroughs presented in the application.

The day started with a courtesy call to MGEN ROBERT M AREVALO AFP, Vice Commander of the Philippine Army. This was followed by interviews with the Senior Leaders of the organization.

On his second day, he had breakfast with LTGEN ROLANDO JOSELITO D BAUTISTA AFP, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army and visited one of the Major Units of the Philippine Army, the Mechanized Infantry Division in the province of Tarlac.

And finally, Mr. McMillan spent his third day of evaluation in the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) to clarify related insights and firm up his key findings for the organization.

**INDUCTION TO THE PALLADIUM HALL OF FAME**

In conclusion, the Philippine Army passed the evaluation process headed by Mr. David McMillan. With this, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LTGEN ROLANDO D BAUTISTA AFP, personally received the award at the “REIMAGINE STRATEGY: Palladium Positive Impact Summit” 2018 last 14-15 March 2018 at the London, United Kingdom. The prestigious award was granted to him by none other than Professor Robert S Kaplan, Emeritus Professor at the Harvard Business School and co-creator of the Balanced Scorecard.

Nevertheless, this award will not end the “Army's transformation journey”. Rather, this will serve as a fervent inspiration to become better, and later on, to become the best.

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Despite having abundant resources, the Balanga remained as one of the cities of Bataan with low revenue relative to its population, leaving little resource for City employees to perform their necessary operations. With this, the city took advantage of their community's best asset - the citizens of Balanga.

Empowering people can be best achieved by educating them. This paved way to the creation of their vision which is “Balanga University Town 2020: The emerging hub for Technology Related Business in the Philippines”. The City of Balanga will be able to achieve this vision by incorporating a well-formulated strategy that will promote transparency and accountability to the community. Through the years, the Balanga was able to engage the community in creating change by improving their systems and processes. This effort was paid off when the city was awarded with Palladium Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame on 21 March 2017.
In 2007, Mayor Jose Enrique S. Garcia III was elected to his first public office as the Mayor of the City of Balanga, the Philippine capital of the Bataan province. The City, with nearly 100,000 citizens and 700 city employees, was in dire need of revitalization. There were relatively few businesses, city revenues were low, young people were leaving the city for opportunities elsewhere, the community was disengaged, and the city’s workforce narrowly focused on their tactical job descriptions. Knowing the need for change, Mayor Garcia decided that a bold and appealing vision, a clear and focused strategy, robust change management, and disciplined execution of that strategy would all be needed to collectively drive revitalization.

BALANGA - A CITY IN NEED OF CHANGE

Balanga as a city in 2007, had a variety of assets that should make for a great place to live. There was plenty of open space to enjoy including seashore, hills, wetlands, and farmland. Many diverse neighbourhood provided the city with variety. And a few educational institutions, including a major state university (Bataan Peninsula State University) ensured youth could build a life in Balanga. Despite these attributes, the city’s economy and lack of community atmosphere created a significant barrier to Balanga’s vitality and growth.

The city was low on revenue relative to its population leaving little resource for City employees to do much more than performing the truly necessary operations of Balanga. Low revenue was mainly attributable to three factors in comparison to similar Philippine cities: (1) relatively low registration of businesses, (2) smaller revenues from registered businesses, and (3) underperforming City-owned or managed properties. The financial strain on the City made it harder to attract new investments. Without new economic opportunity coming to Balanga, young people leave to find opportunity elsewhere even if they had received college education in the City.

The relationship between the community and the city government was strained. With few resources to invest in community programming, Balanga employees focused on sustaining vital services. Citizens did not feel they needed to contribute to the city government, and there were few mechanisms for community feedback and engagement.

Clearly the city was in need of a strategy to take advantage of the cities assets while addressing the city’s most pressing needs and driving change. In order to begin the process of designing and executing that strategy, Mayor Garcia decided to adopt the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework as the core of their “Performance Governance System” (PGS) program. He needed a system that would clarify the city’s goals, motivate the city’s employees and achieve buy-in from his constituents and the city’s various stakeholders so that Balanga’s revitalization could become reality.
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INCLUSIVE VISION

At the start of the vision casting process, the City of Balanga assessed their geographic location, assets and capabilities relative to the region. The original vision was introduced in September 2008: “By 2020, a world class University Town: center for political, economic, social and cultural interaction in the Asia Pacific Region.” This vision drove the strategy and BSC processes taking place in the city for the first couple years of Mayor Garcia’s administration.

As the city progressed towards its vision, panellists from the PGS annual evaluation committee challenged the phrase ‘world-class’ in the city’s vision. They felt it was unrealistic to achieve ‘world-class’ university town status by 2020 as the phrase is usually reserved to well-known university cities such as Cambridge in Massachusetts. Balanga took the opportunity to engage some additional internal and external stakeholders. The next version of the vision was “Balanga University Town: Among the Top 5 IT-BPM (Information Technology – Business Process Management) locations in the Philippines by 2020”. As the Mayor and other city officials started to communicate this new refinement of the vision they realized it didn’t generate much enthusiasm among the community; community and stakeholder participation in vision casting had still been too minimal.

The process grew to include an even wider variety of stakeholders representing as many of the constituents’ points of view as possible. Forums to gather feedback included participation of the Mayor, city employees, the City Council, community leaders in the form of the MSGC (Multi Sector Governance Coalition), the community at large and outside agencies. All these perspectives helped to craft a vision that was ambitious but achievable. With the concept of learning cities and knowledge-based business embedded in the discussions, the vision of the city was finalized to be “Balanga University Town 2020: The Emerging Hub for Knowledge-based Businesses in the Philippines.”

In 2016, with the change of leadership in the Mayor’s office, the vision was modified slightly to become “Balanga University Town 2020: The Emerging Hub for Technology Related Businesses in the Philippines.” While the changes in the vision’s wording were small, each successive change brought more participation and further refined the strategy, while keeping the overall goal firmly in sight. Most importantly, a broad process participation meant that the city as a whole bought into the vision, a vision that drove a sense of belief, unity and excitement throughout the city.

A CLEAR AND FOCUSED STRATEGY

While crafting an inclusive and motivational vision was important, it was just the first step towards transformation. In order to help drive all the change demanded by the vision, the city created a Strategy Map with 5 perspectives:
Customer, Process, Organization, Finance, and Citizen with a clear set of underlying values (Love of God, Integrity, Commitment) and mission (“Build a family-oriented city with a strong learning atmosphere that will ensure sustainable development and participatory governance”).

Within the Strategy Map were several Pinaka Importanteng Gawain (Wildly Important Goals) also known as PIGs. These simple and clear goals defined the changes needed in each of the five perspectives and helped to motivate the staff by showing them that their job could have impact each day. Some examples of the strategic objectives are “Ensure comprehensive start-up support and incentive program”, “Attain fund adequacy through progressive revenue generation”, and “Institutionalize a learning, healthy, and family oriented lifestyle throughout the City”.

Each objective on the Map is supported by at least one initiative. One of the most visible early initiatives was the transformation of the city’s central plaza. When Mayor Garcia was elected, the city owned some of the buildings around the plaza, but they were not fully utilized, the plaza didn’t reflect the image of a University Town, and the city was actually losing money by renting out space on the plaza at below market rate. With the aid of public-private partnerships, the city transformed two of the spaces around the plaza into a new hotel and a new indoor mall with the specifications designed to conserve the culture and the heritage of Balanga. This very visible transformation not only revitalized the plaza and increased the tax base, but it also served notice to the community that change is possible. The space where the mall (Galleria Victoria) is now creating significantly more lease payment, PHP 10,927,270 in 2015, than it did before the initiative, PHP 673,035 in 2007.

![The Plaza Transformation from 2007 to 2016](image)

*Figure 1: The Plaza Transformation from 2007 to 2016*

During the first few years of the PGS implementation, the strategy was cascaded to individual departments using the same Strategy Map and Balanced Scorecard structure. Most of the City’s initiatives were largely departmental in nature even when requiring the support of other departments. This dynamic often led to a silo mentality where departments only interacted with each other as necessary and initiatives were accomplished without city-wide buy-in.
DEMOLISHING SILOS THROUGH INITIATIVE EXECUTION

In 2014 the city changed the way initiatives were planned and executed. Each initiative was broken down into discrete, manageable tasks or projects, and these were assigned to Vision-Aligned Circles (VACs) at the city-level, instead of the department level. VACs are strategic teams that contain between 5 to 10 employees from multiple departments who are assigned to deliver a particular strategic project. Instead of cascading the Strategic Initiatives to each of the departments, the Strategic Initiatives from the City’s Strategy Map are cascaded directly to the rank-and-file employees through the VACs. The VAC teams are formulated to empower people who haven’t worked with each other before to do so. The entire initiative and the VACs working on it are performing under the oversight of an Initiative Owner.

At first, there was some resistance from employees because it seemed like more unnecessary change demanding extra time and effort beyond their routine workload. Getting initial momentum relied on departmental leaders explicitly supporting the VACs and encouraging their staff to find time to work on their projects. As employees joined VACs, they started seeing the benefits. Employees began to break down the silos between the various departments and forge close working relationships across the City.

VAC members also found creative ways to make time for the additional work. For example, each VAC is required to have a Weekly Operational Review Meeting (WORM). This is a weekly review of the project that is conducted within the individual VAC team. In order to find a suitable time to meet for a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 60 minutes a week, many of the VACs discovered that the WORM could be squeezed in between the weekly flag raising ceremony that all employees attend and when departments start their public-facing hours.

The VAC model has had two unplanned benefits: (1) creating a more inclusive work environment through stronger employee relationships and (2) allowing employees to see and take pride in how they are effecting positive change and the realization of the City’s strategic vision.

THE ‘BALANGUEÑOS’ FACTOR – BUILDING GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT FOR THE CHANGE

Motivating City employees is one thing – they are paid – but to truly make change happen the City needed to enlist the support of the community as a whole. Political speeches, position papers, and local media reporting is the typical approach. The City of Balanga knew that these less engaging methods would not be sufficient and instead pursued a multi-modal approach that would both explain to the community and demonstrate the necessary changes in a comprehensive and interactive way.

The city used traditional media channels to communicate the strategy. The city has an official public affairs outlet (the COB News Channel) and a radio and television program called “Ka Elias, Live!” The City used these channels to broadcast daily with simple
messages about the strategy and initiatives, designed to be understood by a broad audience. The City also leveraged social media channels such as Facebook and YouTube to disseminate audio and visual presentations about the city.

To communicate the vision and promote learning in the community, the city set up 5 “pocket” parks along the city's busy thoroughfare, Capitol Drive. The pocket parks are equipped with interactive educational kiosks (Walk of Knowledge & Walkipedia) and free wireless internet access points. Information on the City’s strategy is readily available at the kiosks. These two projects were anchored on the principle of transparency and accountability in governance and access to learning applications and tools.

Realising that not everyone would get the message through radio, television, social media, and kiosks, the City Government of Balanga launched a unique program called the Learning Barangay Week. This is an activity where the City Mayor, Councilors, Department Heads and other city personnel immerse themselves for one week at a time in each one of the 25 Barangays (districts) in Balanga. During this week in each district a campaign is conducted to promote understanding of the vision, progress against the initiatives is communicated, a general assembly is held with forum-like discussions between the community and the leaders, direct feedback from citizens is solicited, and the community is encouraged to actively participate in the strategy process. These weeks are also a time to provide additional intensive programming in that Barangay like medical clinics, employment and livelihood programs, disaster response trainings, and education and scholarship campaigns.

Another communication mechanism with the community is the Multi Sector Governance Coalition (MSGC) - better known in the city as “Ugnayang Balangueño”. The MSGC is a group that is common in most Local Government Units in the Philippines, but in Balanga they have a special relationship with the city. MSGCs are made up of representatives from various sectors (health, business, IT, education, etc.) and the council acts as a liaison between the government and the community. In the City of Balanga, the MSGC members are all established and successful people who joined because of their firm belief in the vision of Balanga and their desire to give back to the community. Most MSGCs meet only monthly and are simply advisors. Ugnayang Balangueño meets almost weekly and actively participates in the strategy execution process. They act as a communication channel to the citizens, provide honest feedback to the government, and use community input when they review initiatives during the semi-annual “Local VAC Revalida”. The Local VACs Revalida (Evaluation) is when leaders gather to assess the impact of the initiative portfolio as a whole, measure the progress against the initiative timelines, and renew or replace completed initiatives. More than that, the MSGC of the City of Balanga, has their own Initiatives or projects that promote the vision of the city.

Intentional communication with citizens and stakeholders has been key to garnering community support and has changed the way Balangueños (people of Balanga) interact with the city. This transformation is evident in
many ways, from the types of conversation being conducted (e.g., incorporating feedback into ordinances) to the community coming together to have fun (e.g., 16% of the city participating in the largest dance fitness class in a single venue for which the city achieved a Guinness World Record).

Figure 2: Largest Dance Fitness Class - Guinness World Record

SUSTAINING A CULTURE OF CHANGE

Strategy Execution has been integrated into all levels of the City. The Leadership team are hands-on in strategy creation, communication and management. They actively participate in the process and encourage the staff to do the same. Strategy execution reminders and encouragement are part of almost every communication and updates on progress occur regularly during weekly flag raising ceremonies and departmental meetings.

Including the entire staff and parts of the community in strategy execution while still progressing towards the vision requires organization, discipline and processes tailored to the organization. Two teams are instrumental in ensuring the smooth operation of the Strategy Execution processes. The first group, the PGS Core Team was formed by executive order, to help with the execution and to cascade the strategy to the rank and file employees. Originally a technical working group, it has evolved over the years and now is the equivalent of a senior leadership team as it is comprised of the department heads working hand in hand with the Mayor. They help ensure the process is followed and that employees have the appropriate time and resources to work on their initiatives. They are also involved in ensuring each staff member is included in a VAC based on the initiative and the capabilities of the employee.

The second group is the Office of Strategy Management (OSM). The OSM facilitates all strategy creation, development and monitoring in the City of Balanga and promotes a sense of shared governance by enlisting the support of the government and community. Governance includes the aforementioned Weekly Operational Review Meeting (WORM) for VACs, the Local VACs Revalidas, and the Monthly Strategy Review Meeting (MSRM) of the PGS Core Team and Initiative
Owners. The OSM also handles strategic communications, initiative management and scorecard management. Together with the PGS core team they ensure continuity in the strategy execution processes and disseminate lessons-learned across the organization.

TRANSFORMATION OF BALANGA

Since 2007 there has been an impressive transformation throughout the city.

Becoming a university town means improving education is a priority, and the city has made great strides in this area. The city created the Barangay Learning Hubs, where the city provides computers, training, software and a safe place to study in order to equip students to perform and achieve more. The learning hubs are used by approximately 9000 students per year and improvements can be seen in their academic performance. In the spirit of expanding learning to the whole family, the city created an EduChild program. This program both teaches and encourages good parenting by providing multiple modules of practical education conducted by the city day care workers. At the university level, the number of government scholars increased bringing greater expertise and notoriety to the City’s higher education institutions.

Another very visible success is the city’s public market. In 2007 it posted a PHP 2 million deficit that became a gross income of PHP 42 million in 2015. The performance governance system played a significant part in this turnaround as the city’s strong vision, transparency and organizational approach changed the mind-set of market stakeholders. The public market has evolved to become a model market for other local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines.

The city’s revenue has improved, which has been critical to enabling continued investments in initiatives and programming that drive the strategy. Key to this result has been the doubling of the number of registered businesses and the average growth of each registered business. One example of this inflow of capital is the presence of Jollibee, a popular fast food chain in the Philippines. The franchise had a single Balanga location in 2007, but has now grown to five, including one of the highest grossing locations in the Philippines. The growth of this and many other businesses has created jobs, directly impacting the welfare of the city, and significantly lowering the incidence of poverty.

The real transformation is not the infrastructure or any of the projects that the city has undertaken. This is with the changed culture of the employees serving the city’s population each day. This is clear in an address by the former Mayor, Congressman Jose Enrique S. Garcia, III, “Balanced Scorecard provides the local chief executive with practical tools that monitor and evaluate all actions taken by the organization and its stakeholders. Through this method, not only are our employees performing their mandated responsibilities, but hand in hand with our Balangueño citizens, they are also working on projects that are critical components in the attainment of our vision.” The PGS has changed the way the staff approach their daily tasks, sharpened their motivation to contribute and created an incredible Balangueño spirit to achieve the
overarching vision together.

As the City of Balanga continues to progress towards achieving their 2020 vision. The government remains committed to its strategy execution systems and processes even through the recent change of leadership. In the lead up to the most recent strategy refresh, newly-elected Mayor Francis Garcia said “we need to ensure that we do not only sustain, but we should also advance the strategy further.”

ABOUT THE CITY

The City of Balanga is the capital of Bataan province in Central Luzon (Region III), Philippines. The name ‘Balanga’ came from ‘banga’ which means claypot as Balangueños (people of Balanga) were known as excellent potters. With a population of 96,061, the City of Balanga consist of 25 Barangays (districts). It is strategically located 124 km by land and 31.2 nautical miles by ferry from Manila.

Balanga occupies a relatively small area and is surrounded by highly industrial locations with tax advantages, such as Mariveles (home of the Freeport Area of Bataan), Olongapo City in Zambales Province (home of the Subic Freeport Zone), Angeles City in Pampanga (site of the Clark Economic Zone). The city turned what seemed like a disadvantage into an opportunity by aiming to be a University Town as a complement to the surrounding neighbourhoods. An ordinance was passed in 2008 by the Hon. Jose Enrique S. Garcia III, declaring the city centre as a University Town and beginning the change process.

The decision to be a University town is anchored by Balanga’s identity and strength as the province’s centre of education. The City of Balanga has 1 state university, 10 colleges, 9 secondary schools, 30 elementary schools, 28-day care centres, and 32 pre-schools.

In order to help them implement the necessary changes and achieve their goal to become a University Town, Balanga decided to join a nationwide governance initiative by adopting the Balanced Scorecard methodology as a key part of the Performance Governance System (PGS). PGS was developed by the Institute of Solidarity in Asia (ISA) and is heavily influenced by Kaplan-Norton strategy management concepts including the Execution Premium Process™.
INTRODUCTION

The change from a predominantly rural world to an urban one has been one of the most notable global transformations in the recent years. This rapid shift have considered security threats as more diverse, and less predictable (Hills 2014), and with it, as well as the rising pressures of urbanization, both in fragile and conflict-affected countries, increased concerns on the vulnerability of cities to armed threats continue to develop (Sampaio 2016). Additionally, the twenty first century have demonstrated how changes in the character of armed conflict, together with its effects on cities of the developing world have exposed gaps in the planning, practice and execution of military urban operations (Sampaio 2016) indicating the increasing significance of the military understanding of urban warfare.
According to Sampaio (2016), the adoption of tactical guidelines that prioritize combat operations and presume a clear-cut separation between war and peace has remained as the prevailing military practice and theory when it comes to the conduct of urban operations. He further added that military doctrines and practice have had little or no interaction with ideas from planning, development and administration of cities, which results to tactical biases and the development of generic concepts and doctrines (Sampaio 2016).

With the potential of urban operations to become a critical security issue in the twenty first century, as well as the recent incidents that challenged the Philippine Army’s proficiencies, it is vital for the organization to assess its readiness in the conduct of urban operations. Conversely, with the existing campaign taking place in Marawi, shortcoming, as well as lessons learned, in respect to the execution of urban operations can be unveiled.

**GENERAL OBJECTIVES**

To evaluate the effects of the Marawi campaign to the current and future capability and conduct of operations of the Philippine Army.

**SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

1. To identify the major issues encountered by the Philippine Army during the Marawi campaign;
2. To determine the major capability gaps during the Marawi campaign;
3. To specify the actions taken by the Philippine Army with regard to the operations that took place in Marawi; and,
4. To identify the effects of the Marawi campaign to the current and future capability and conduct of operations of the Philippine Army.

**SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

The study will cover the Philippine Army’s operations during the Marawi campaign. It will examine the major issues encountered by the organization, as well as the major capability gaps during the execution of various operations in order for the organization to re-evaluate its future strategy. It will also look at the actions taken by the organization in order to address the identified issues and gaps and to determine which of those effectively contributed to the conduct of the said campaign. To further substantiate the data, this study will also check on the utilization, employment, and impact of the support provided by the higher headquarters through the narratives of the soldiers deployed in the ground.

Any additional aspects on doctrine, organization, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities developed, created, and implemented in the course of the Marawi campaign will also be evaluated to assess its effectiveness and to determine its contribution and/or significance in the current and future capability and operations of the Philippine Army.

This study, however, is limited only to the Philippine Army’s experience during the Marawi campaign.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The urbanizing world continue to post challenges for the military, hence the Philippine Army needs to ensure a holistic strategy that will encapsulate the necessary doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities that will enable it to overcome whatever kind of conflicts it may face. Understanding the urban strategic environment can help the organization, as well as the leadership craft comprehensive policies, and come up with sound decisions (Sampaio 2016). Further, Alice Hills, as cited by Sampaio (2016), argues that tactical emphasis by militaries in their strategic and doctrinal documents is necessary but not sufficient to understand such a complex environment. With this, there is a need to assess the current strategy of militaries to see if it is competent enough to address different types of threats in diverse kinds of operational environments.

With recent combat encounters taking place in urban areas, e.g. Zamboanga Siege and Marawi Rebellion, and with the experiences of the organization with reference to these campaigns, there is a pressing need to evaluate the current capabilities of the Philippine Army, and to check on the way it conduct its operations. Given this concern, this study will delve on the Philippine Army’s experiences during the Marawi Rebellion to evaluate the organization’s conduct of urban operations. Using this campaign as a starting point in the assessment of the organization’s competence during urban warfare, the issues, gaps, lessons learned as well as the best practices illustrated during the said campaign will be evaluated in this research paper to aid the organization in the determination and evaluation of its current and future strategy, to include its capabilities, and the conduct of its operations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Military Operations in Urban Terrain

Various literature on urban fighting suggests that operations in cities will be difficult to avoid in the future as it was in the past (Hills 2004), hence the military should ensure utmost understanding of how to maneuver in these types of conflict. Even though historical experiences insinuate that these types of operations are costly, vicious, and therefore should be avoided, the probability and diversity of urban operations illustrates the importance of knowing how to go about this type of operating environment as threats are considered to be less predictable, but are potentially more lethal and difficult to manage. Further, operations in the urban terrain are subject to restrictive legal and moral rules, with information technology being exploited by both conventional militaries and networked terrorist groups. These characteristics make it even harder for the military to execute their operations, and to successfully complete their mission.

According to the authoritative US Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations Urban Operations are operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where manmade construction or the density
of noncombatants are the dominant features.

At present, most of the techniques, tactics and procedures used in urban operations are the same with any other operations, disregarding the unique aspects of operating in cities. The application, however, of generic concepts and doctrines and broad operational options would not be sufficient as distinct aspects of urban operations call for special doctrine, training and specially adapted arms and equipment.

It is generally agreed that in urban operations the movement of friendly forces between buildings is often the major source of casualties. Also, logistics takes on special importance since the consumption of food, water and ammunition is typically higher, while supply is especially difficult, demonstrating the fact that cities are militarily challenging. With this it is imperative for the organization to recognize challenges for future conduct of operations, to quote Hills (2014):

“Today’s uncertainties and shortages mean that a premium is placed on developing a resilient and flexible force structure capable of dealing with the unexpected”.

**Methodology**

In the conduct of this research, the framework in the next page was utilized:
The framework intends to dichotomize the Campaign in Marawi in relation to its effect to the current and future capabilities and also the conduct of operations of the Philippine Army.

The upper portion elaborates the intent of the research as stated above. The body is divided into three primary parts: the left portion is about the Army Capabilities; and the right portion on the other hand is about how the Army is deployed and how it conducts Operations; and, in between is the method or source of data that will be processed, it may either be from reports from the field and narratives of the interviewees from the field.

The left portion of the framework focuses to afloat and highlight the major capability gaps that were identified by the different army units deployed in the Marawi Campaign in order to be able to dissect the said gaps into a simpler term related to the DOTMLPF framework (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel and Equipment, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities. The right portion on the other hand intends to highlight the operational issues experienced by the same different army units that were deployed in the Campaign in Marawi, broken down into the PA’s Warfighting Functions or more popularly known to others as the Battlefield Operating System or the BOS (Intelligence, Maneuver, Fires, Air Defense, Mobility and Counter-mobility, Command and Control C2, Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Sustainment, and Reservist).

The most important and critical portion of the research framework, is the bottom portion which comprises the analysis, assessments, and recommendation. This portion intends to analyze the data based from the reports from the ground and narratives from the interviewees on the Army Capability vis-à-vis its cause and effect relationships with the results of the Army Operations. The cross analysis between the Army Operations and Army Capability will also be cross referenced to the 2010-2016 Assessments of the Army Strategy focusing on its (Strategy) impact or lack of it to the campaign and experiences in Marawi. Lastly, the assessment and recommendation intend to contribute to the future capability development and thrust of the Army and it will be based purely and objectively on the results of the aforementioned analysis.

**ASSESSMENTS**

**Warfighting Functions**

**Intelligence**

With the data presented, it was evident that intelligence utilized during the campaign was HUMINT-centered. Data shows that other aspects of intelligence are either limited or lacking. With this, it was observed that HUMINT is not enough to sustain all phases of operations, i.e. planning, preparation and execution.

It was further observed that organization and training were focused on intelligence collection, and that the processing or the analysis and production aspect were overlooked. This was further aggravated by the limited intelligence equipment, facilities and systems that should be utilized in order to provide real time
To temporarily address these gaps, the troops made use of commercial drones, an equipment which is already being utilized by the enemy placing them in an advantage. For navigation, google maps were used.

**Fire Support**

The government forces have an overwhelming advantage in firepower and capabilities. However, these advantages somewhat or somehow are being neutralized by the characteristics of an urban terrain leaving most of the daily battles and engagements into infantry versus infantry, sniper versus sniper, or foot soldiers versus foot soldiers.

Superiority in firepower basically results to lots of collateral damages on the structures in the engagement area. The shock effect of superior firepower has a descending impact, meaning, the longer the conflict the more ‘immune’ the enemies are to its effects over time.

Air superiority is most effective if the government troops would consider less the collateral damages it will cause. It also has a very fatal disadvantage if miscommunication between the ground troops and the pilots occur.

**Mobility and Survivability**

The activation of the 500ECB (P) greatly contributed to the mobility of the units deployed in the ground. Moreover, the successful breaching operations enable the combat units to move forward. Avoidance of open kill-zones restricted enemy fires. The “wall-to-wall” operations brought about by the breaching operations avoided enemy observations and deny enemy snipes in inflicting casualties.

In the troops’ experience during the Marawi campaign, it was evident that except for the Light Reaction Regiment (LRR), which has limited breaching capability, the organization has no clear existing concept on the utilization of combat engineers for MOUT in the conduct of combined arms operations, though the assumed task is to provide mobility and survivability support through breaching of obstacles in the main engagement area is evidently executed by only one of the Engineer Combat Companies.

The 500ECB (P) also lacks equipment, hence equipment being utilized are equipment intended for HADR Operations. Further, to ensure accomplishment of mission, as well as to circumvent sniper and counter-mobility tactics employed by the Maute terrorists, the unit improvises on the equipment being utilized. This demonstrates that the abrupt activation of the 500ECB (P) demonstrates the lack of capability of the organization to address these types of threats, given its current organizational structure.

**1. Maneuver**

The initial composition and disposition of troops in Marawi were evidently not sufficient to address the threat posed by the Maute Terrorist Group.
Deployment of additional units and troops necessitates to task organize those units into Joint Task Forces. However, these Joint Task Forces do not significantly demonstrate its combined and joint capabilities and deployment. Instead, JTFs are somewhat given area of operations which in effect cannot distinguish the utilization of the different forces (Special Units and Infantry), except for the snipers and combat engineers.

Force to Enemy Ratio in Urbanized terrain is difficult to manage since cleared buildings and properties need to be guarded and secured.

Special individual and unit equipment are essential in urbanized terrain to improve observation and identification, maneuverability, protection, and even firepower.

2. Command and Control

The establishment of the joint task forces improved the command, control, and communications of the operating and controlling units in Marawi.

Blue Force Tracking system for common operational picture demonstrated its potential in Marawi, though it needs to be improved for better effectiveness.

Commercial mobile communication system is widely utilized providing immediate means to transmit information for both the government troops, the enemy, and even the civilians. There is no evident established security protocol on this communication system.

3. Sustainment

The higher headquarters were able to provide for the sustainability of the campaign in terms of personnel support and health services. However, it was observed that the support needed by the troops are only provided on need basis and were apparently delayed in relation to the necessity of the situation.

It was further discovered that the Personnel Management Doctrine (PAM 1-00) was not sufficient for the Marawi Campaign, hence, there is a need for the organization to review, re-evaluate and update the said doctrine to ensure responsiveness in times of urban conflict.

One of the concerns faced during the campaign was the low fill-up of medical units and personnel, who are mostly utilized for health services and CASEVAC, and Post-Combat Stress Debriefing, which were also limited in nature. However, fund support from the higher headquarter for the provision of equipment, medicine, funeral services, etc. Nonetheless, sustainment of units only includes special reinstatement of personnel, and assignment and reassignment of units (SOCOM, 5SRB and 500ECBn).

4. Information Operations

The IO Cell was established as it was deemed necessary to ensure integration of all information-related capabilities and other war-fighting capabilities to dominate the information environment to address and counter the propaganda efforts of the threat.
group and to reduce the interference of civilians to the ongoing military operations. With it, the synchronization and integration of all information-related capabilities and other war-fighting capabilities to dominate the information environment was ensured. It also helped address and counter the propaganda efforts of the threat groups and reduce the interference of civilians to the ongoing military operations.

However, it should be noted that the PA has no doctrine for IO; only the AFP Manual was available for utilization.

It was also noted that information operations should be equally targeting the enemy forces, the civilians affected, the national and international perception, and even IO for the operating troops. IO for the different targets audience should be deliberately planned and implemented.

5. Civil-Military Operations

The CMO capability allowed the Philippine Army to address the non-combat aspects of the military operation essential to the success of the mission. Civil Affairs addressed issues related to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). It also facilitated the flow of support for the IDPs and for the troops from Non-Government Organizations and the public. It also helped in reducing the interference of civilians to the ongoing military operations. The ability to provide timely public information addressed the public’s need to know that the situation is under control of government forces thus maintaining the trust and confidence of the people as shown by the high trust rating of the AFP. The CMO capability also contributed in addressing propaganda efforts of the TGs to prevent them from getting sympathy from the Muslim population.

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6. Reservists

In the mobilization of the reservists during the campaign, it was observed that the bureaucratic system delays the approval of the official declaration of mobilization which hampers the responsiveness of RRUs to local emergencies, however, by establishing the Mobilization Protocol at the level of the DND and the GHQ, as well as through the updating, refinement and proper dissemination of the Army Mobilization of 2012 this gap may be addressed.

Further, the need to increase the readiness condition of RRUs prior to mobilization was deemed vital during the campaign. This effort should be complemented by the conduct of a periodic evaluation and assessment of RRU
readiness to be conducted by Infantry Divisions and ARESSCOM.

It was also impractical to mobilize battalion-size RRU units because some are actually unemployable due to being very too old for military duties, hence it was recommended that company-size units for selective mobilization be deployed in order to be able to select the most qualified reservist for duty.

Lastly, the mobilization of reservists in the campaign is an unprogrammed activity that cannot be sustained by PA appropriations for a long period, hence, HPAG9 recommends the programming of mobilization funds for 3 RR Companies for 3 months (PhP 4.24 million per Coy per month).

The Reserve Force provided manpower assistance in support to the Regular Troops conducting activities in the area. However, the functions of the activated and mobilized Ready Reserve Units (RRUs) were limited only to providing security assistance during the evacuation of wounded personnel; conduct of checkpoint operations and security patrols in Iligan City; distribution of relief goods; funeral honors and vigil guards; and administrative support to Regular Units. With this, the result of the reserve force employment was manpower augmentation.

a. On Capability Gaps

1. **Doctrine:** Current doctrine of the PA on the different Warfighting Functions already include as one of its component the Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). However, the PA has no actual and specific doctrine on MOUT that integrates or combines the different warfighting functions into delivering the most potent and efficient way to operate in an urban terrain against a particular type of threat (domestic, external, or hybrid).

2. **Organization and Training:** The lack of a specific doctrine for MOUT also resulted to a partially insufficient Task Organization and Training to address the different situations in an urban terrain.

3. **Materiel and Equipment:** Some of the standard equipment that are used for Internal Security Operations is insufficient for MOUT. Individual and crew serve weapons, individual protective armor, and some special equipment were not readily available; even the issued standard combat boots are not designed for such terrain. But given the current and existing equipment, the different units resort to improvisations in order to somehow close the identified issues on lacking or limited capabilities.

4. **Leadership:** Among the different aspects of the army capabilities, the leadership aspect is one of the strengths of the Philippine Army soldiers and units. Leadership was exemplified at the different level of the organization, from the Commanders of the different component units and even down to the individual soldiers in the ground, most especially giving emphasis on the NCO leadership and gallantry of the soldiers. This is one of the aspect of the organization that the Filipino soldiers, the people, and the nation can truly be proud
5. **Personnel**: All of the units that were deployed in Marawi has low personnel readiness rating, especially on the aspect of the fill-up of the different units. As per the experiences in the Zamboanga Siege and especially the Marawi Campaign, Operations in Urbanized Terrain is extremely manpower intensive. The operations in this type of terrain requires massive troops to maneuver and at the same time secure cleared areas and structures. Combat and non-combat casualties are also very high in this type of operation as it easily takes toll on the physical and mental state of the troops thus lowering resistance for diseases and at the same time the increased the risk of being hit by enemy or friendly fires, and sometimes even incurred wounds from accidents.

6. **Facilities**: For Operations in Urbanized Terrain, there is actually very limited need for a fixed or existing structure, however, the primary facility for military operation that should be established immediately should include the command, control, and communication facilities, health service support facilities, structure, and organization, Logistics support facility, POW detention areas, among others. For non-military use, evacuation centers for internally displaced people and warehouse for donations and supplies are essential.

**I. Lessons Learned**

**a. Strategic Lessons**

1. **Terrorism knows no boundaries.** No part of the country is free from its threat. While organized terrorist groups are evidently observed and mostly situated in the island provinces and some mainland areas of Mindanao, the other parts of the country—the main cities and tourist spots—are nevertheless threatened as well. Thus, counterterrorism efforts are not limited to where terrorist groups are actually emanating but rather national in scope. This provided relevance to the declaration of Martial Law not only in Marawi but in the whole Mindanao. The rationale is for the military to be one step ahead in its control such that escalation of the threat’s influence in other areas can be averted at the immediate possible time.
2. The declaration of the Martial Law in Mindanao no doubt provided specific and absolute power to the military in order to provide swift and rapid actions to conduct operations. But the holistic approach in addressing concerns of safety and security of the citizens remain. As observed from the Marawi incident, there is a need to enhance collaboration among major state actors such as the Local Government Units (LGU), Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and the Security sectors. With define functions brought about by a deliberately planned contingency of actions involving the different actors mentioned, before, during and after crisis and conflicts, further escalation of unfavorable conditions should have been prevented or if unavoidable, the effects should have been mitigated.

3. Terrorism associated with the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS) is a global security concern. While its influence is brought mainly by religious sympathy and affiliation, locally, there is more to realize in the dynamics of socio-cultural issues. The AFP must be keen to understand peoples’ culture and the root causes of societal concerns such as education, poverty, criminality and other underlying issues. Doing so will provide varieties of actions during peacetime that will shape future military operations in crisis and conflict situation.

4. Gathered legitimate information revealed that among the issues raised by the Maute group was their outright objection to the passing of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). It has to be noted that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) aims the same. While the latter does not advocate the ISIS propagation, considering however the political intent of undermining the BBL, there is a tendency for the ISIS inspired terrorist organization and the BIFF to merge and be one in the pursuance of this objective. Doing so will make a force to reckon with as well as gaining support from sympathetic organizations and tribes. The military and other concern security sectors must be vigilant to observe indicators of these anticipated outcome and ensure to be at the upper hand even before it can occur. Fast tracking the BBL without sacrificing constitutionality and the interest of the Bangsamoro people may be a positive alternative. While this is underway, credible deterrence from the military and the police force is necessary.

b. Operational Lessons

1. There is a need to develop and enhance the AFP Joint Operating Concept. The conduct of the Marawi campaign was accomplished by organizing several Joint Task Forces (JTF). Relatedly, due to lack of enabling concept such as Joint Operating Concept doctrine wherein all AFP units must anchor plan of actions and executions, unfavorable conditions occurred that resulted to, among others, command and control (C2) and command/support relationship problems. If only that these were made clear earlier, while the outcome is victorious, maybe that the difference could have been a shortened campaign duration and timeline.
of execution with minimal resources utilization and most importantly, lesser casualties.

2. The battlefield is shifting from rural to urban. This made the warfare likewise shift from jungle to military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Combine arms operations therefore must be given emphasis in a way that integration of combine arms elements and units is appropriately mixed and synchronized. Additionally, as seen from the Marawi crisis, special operations such as hostage rescue, structure/ building/ room clearings and the likes are inevitable. Therefore, combine arms elements particularly the infantry units must be trained to execute these kinds of operations. Hence, these competencies must be provided not only for special operations units but to other combat units as well. Combine arms and unit/organizational trainings are essentially important.

3. Combat support elements are vital. The intelligence requirements are integral part of appropriate and timely decisions. Multi-intelligence disciplines such as HUMINT, IMINT, TECHINT etc. are indispensable in all phases of the operation. The use of drones and UAVs were proven very effective in providing actual terrain features and real time scenarios. The engineer unit capabilities acted as game changers in MOUT. They afforded survivability and mobility among others that enhanced the maneuvers and assault of the combat units. Likewise, the fire support provided by the Field Artillery units, Close Air Supports and mortar fires proved to be very effective in fixing enemy positions and inflicting casualties. Demoralizing the will to fight of the enemy was its ultimate effect. On communications, the urban terrain would deter the efficiency and effectiveness of conventional line of sight commo equipment. Alternate modes of communication equipment particularly manpack and portable radios must be considered specially in the conduct of close air and fire supports.

4. Logistics system must be well planned in order to sustain the conduct of operations. Almost all types of supplies will be at a high rate of consumption and will be scarce. Critical resources would demand excellent management and push forwarding of same to the end users will likewise pose great challenge. Some equipment are not available and some will be damaged. Fighting soldiers will be wounded and some will be killed in action. Treatment facilities will not be enough. Immediate replacements of personnel and units to maintain the fighting force will be a priority. Greatest lesson learned is to be full of contingency and innovativeness in order to maintain and sustain the force for at the end the last man standing will eventually declare the victory.

5. Rules of engagement must be strictly followed at all times. While the government forces strictly adhere on this dictum, the adversary always take advantage of these rules. They use structures that are not military targets as battle positions, occupy no fire areas and zones, thus making it hard for the operating troops to attack. While the military anticipate these scenarios, the decision point is to enable the operating troops’ awareness on
identifying military and non-military targets and to when one cease to be a non-military target or objective.

c. Tactical Lessons

1. Commandership at all levels, particularly small unit leadership, proved to be very critical and important. Commanders’ and leaders’ attitude, courage and decisiveness are measures of the fighting morale of troops. While it may be inevitable that some commanders and leaders will be incapacitated due to tactical and administrative reasons, succession of credible commanders must be well established. Capacitating the so called backbones of the organization which are the NCOs will be an added strength of the leadership.

2. While the risk management, both tactical and natural risks, are part of the planning process, provisions for force protection equipment is mandatory and significant. It does not only tend to reduce casualties, but importantly, it boast confidence among the operating troops.

3. Maneuvering forces are prone to sniper fires particularly in open fields and areas. The use of darkness will enhance protection from enemy observation during movement and maneuvers. Night vision and night fighting devices/equipment will be an added advantage.

4. The use of three dimensional maps technologically sourced from the internet enhance appreciation of the actual terrain that are not captured and provided by the conventional military maps used to plot and monitor troops movement and enemy locations.

5. The provisions of tear gas, smoke grenades, flash bang grenades to form part of the soldiers’ basic combat issues must be considered. These equipment proved to be necessary in conducting MOUT particularly in knocking out fortified structures.

II. Recommendation

In lieu of the findings of this study, the Philippine Army should look into the analysis and assessments of this research and further conduct extensive research on the matter to become the future reference of the organization for capability development and strategic planning and implementations.

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The United Nations is the key player in keeping and maintaining international peace and security in times of war and conflict. The U.N conducts peace operations that seek to prevent further conflict and to enforce and build peace in the area. The Philippines has signified its commitment and participation in U.N. operations by providing manpower to various peacekeeping operations. In turn, these international commitment has significantly strengthened the AFP as an organization. Through these, the AFP had improved specialized military skills and ability to engage diplomatically with other nations. Likewise, they have improved their trainings and schooling courses through the U.N.’s world-class learning structures.
ABSTRACT

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has served as the Philippines’ primary force provider in United Nations peace operations since 1963. However, after the incident in Golan Heights and the Ebola outbreak in Liberia in 2014, participation has since been limited to one mission area only. Concomitantly, the benefits gained from participation has yet to be fully maximized for the improvement of the AFP as an organization.

This article thus identified the benefits gained by the AFP from participating in U.N. peace operations and how it relates and may be utilized to strengthen the AFP. It incorporated inputs gathered from the qualitative methodologies of literature review, document analysis, key informant interviews, and focused group discussions undertaken by the undergraduate thesis upon which this article is principally based.

The findings affirmed the proposition that, indeed, participation in U.N. peace operations is a highly beneficial endeavor for the AFP. It extends from the tactical level where peacekeepers acquire and enhance individual skill sets, the organizational level where U.N.-inspired best practices are gained, and up to the strategic level where national interests of maintaining a secure international environment and also global prestige are attained. Risks and other hindrances that prevent full utilization of the benefits gained were likewise identified. Nevertheless, it was ascertained that such challenges are outweighed by the benefits, moreso once these are maximized and institutionalized. With these findings and conclusion, this article sought to promote appreciation and support for the endeavor for the ultimate benefit of the AFP.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations is the major player in keeping and maintaining international peace and security. Among its primary initiatives in doing so is through the conduct of U.N. peace operations in conflicted and war-torn areas for more than 60 years now. It draws upon Member-States for personnel and resources. Member states, however, are not obligated or required to contribute troops; rather, countries participate of their own choice.

Philippine Participation in U.N. Peace Operations

The Philippines, as a member of the U.N., has a commitment in helping maintain global peace and stability. For decades, the Philippines has participated in a total of 21 UN peace operations, including Haiti, Kashmir, Abyei, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur, Georgia, Golan Heights, Kosovo, Liberia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Timor-

1This article is primarily based upon the undergraduate thesis titled “Strengthening the Philippine Security Sector through Participation in UN Peace Operations: An Analysis” co-written by the authors with Ms. Elmira R. Cacalda, Ms. Febry Sue D. Lacastesantos, and Ms. Irene C. Tan in March 2016. It qualified as one of the best theses of AB International Studies Batch 2016 and was presented in the 2016 International Studies Research Colloquium of Far Eastern University, Manila.
Leste, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, and Nepal. The nature of operations that the Philippines has participated in mostly involve humanitarian assistance, law enforcement operations, and rebuilding and restructuring post-conflict areas.

The Philippines has also formulated its policy framework and guidelines (PFG) with regard to its participation in U.N. peace operations. Executive Order No. 97 which approves the adaptation of the “Policy Framework and Guidelines for Philippine Participation in United Nations Peace Operations” was signed in 2002. The PFG governs all decisions regarding Philippine participation in UN peace operations, directing periodic review and update of the country’s participation given the constantly changing nature of peace operations.

Furthermore, the Philippines has signified its commitment to have existing units ready for deployment within a specified period through the U.N. Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, a mechanism that now clearly defines the criteria and steps to be taken by Troop Contributing Countries in order to operationalize their personnel and logistics commitments. This replaced the U.N. Standby Arrangements System in July 2015 by which the Philippines pledged to work on having readily-deployable units through a Memorandum of Agreement.

**AFP’s role and participation in U.N. peace operations**

U.N. peace operations actually comprise several activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Although the AFP primarily contributes peacekeeping personnel for the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement in a mission area, involvement has become multidimensional as peacekeeping efforts may be, for instance, in support of ongoing negotiations to reduce hostilities, that is peacemaking, or for the prevention of regression to conflict as the foundations for long-term peace are established during peacebuilding.

The country’s participation in U.N. missions began with the deployment of combat troops, the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), during the 1950s. From 1950 to 1955, the Philippines sent five (5) battalion combat teams, composed of members of the Philippine Army, deemed most adaptable to frontline conflict conditions overseas in order to counter the advances of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, then supported by China and the Soviet Union, upon South Korea.

This served as the precedent for the Philippines’ involvement in U.N. peacekeeping; it started in...
1962 when the country and other UN Member-States were called upon to specifically support the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC). As a response, a tactical fighter squadron of the Philippine Airforce was deployed to ONUC for four months, marking the Philippines’ first peacekeeping mission.\(^5\)

The AFP has since been active and involved in numerous UN peacekeeping missions, including the send-off of military troops in Sub-Saharan Africa, Iraq-Kuwait, Kosovo, and with particular priority to the Southeast Asian region through missions such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and the United Nations Mission in East Timor/United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste.

At present, the AFP remains a provider of manpower and support to the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti; the company-sized 20th Philippine Contingent to Haiti which finished its stint on June 2017 capped the latest troop deployment at 135. The organization, training, and administrative work is handled by the AFP Peacekeeping Operations Center (AFPPKOC), ensuring complete preparation and support for AFP units and personnel in the performance of their peacekeeping roles in U.N. missions.

**Benefits of participating in U.N. peace operations**

Central to the Philippines’ participation in UN peace operations is state interest; protection of the people and the state is mandated by Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution to the AFP. This is further qualified in the context of U.N. peacekeeping participation by E.O. 97 which states that Philippine participation shall take into account the following factors: national defense and security capabilities; the domestic peace and order situation; and national interest and goals. Given that participation in U.N. peace operations is indeed an avenue to strengthen the institution and capabilities of the armed forces in order to enable the aforementioned factors and the ultimate pursuit of its mandate, it is ideal to maximize the opportunity of participating.

The thrust of strengthening security institutions is elaborated in the National Security Plan 2017-2022; the plan is described as “a declaration of the Government’s commitment to continuously develop a national security system that is... able to effectively respond not only to security threats but also to opportunities beneficial to the national interest. Indeed, national interests are helped fulfilled by the AFP through capacity building, particularly in the individual skills gained by the participants and the effective policy frameworks implemented by the government and community they are deployed to, a tool to strengthen the AFP.

As the study revealed, participating in UN peace operations has indeed proven highly beneficial to AFP at the tactical, organizational, and strategic level through individual skills gained, organizational best practices, and national security interests maintained respectively.

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\(^5\)Hermoso & Belleza, 1.
Individual skills gained

Technical skills are among the most honed capabilities of those selected to serve as U.N. peacekeepers. The selection begins with the screening and processing of prospective peacekeepers, identifying those who possess the particular skill set required by the positions and tasks of the mission. Afterwards, participating troops will be equipped and undergo pre-deployment training (PDT) in order to further enhance the particular skills they were selected for and prepare them as a whole for the nuances and demands of the mission. In actuality, PDT and subsequent trainings during the deployment phase to the enhancement of technical skills. Considering that deployment is in a foreign country and that the mission’s mandate is in support of improving circumstances shaped by various different factors that troops are not accustomed to back in the Philippines, trainings are highly focused and considerably help the troops become well-rounded and exposed to different kinds of security environments. Making this possible are the world-class trainings from the UN, which in turn help the AFP’s instructors to better facilitate the trainings initiated by the Command. Those who are projected to do field work enhance skills such as shooting, patrol, transport services, and VIP security. Some are office-based, doing administrative work at the headquarters, but their technical skills are nonetheless honed as mission-specific and cross-cutting trainings with other U.N. personnel are conducted during the course of their deployment.

In spite of all the preparation that peacekeepers must undergo, the reality of actually arriving at the mission and doing their respective tasks is still a new experience as they are thrust into a foreign land, must work with an ethnically and culturally diverse environment, and are required to speak in a language not native to the Filipino tongue. Thus, most respondents attested that their interpersonal skills, such as relating with other nationalities and communicating through English, were highly enhanced during their stint as a peacekeeper.

More than that, peacekeepers strengthen their confidence both personally and professionally. Participation in a U.N. peacekeeping mission opens up numerous opportunities to practically enhance their skills, especially those by which they were selected. From the pre-deployment training to those conducted during the missions and the exercises conducted with other countries’ peacekeepers, Filipino peacekeepers return with high confidence in their capabilities. On the personal side, they also become more confident in interacting with other people due to their experience with their foreign colleagues and the constant use of English as the main medium of communication.

Organizational best practices

Contingents undergo three main training phases before and during deployment to their mission: PDT, mission-specific induction training, and on-going trainings.6 The latter

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two are conducted by the U.N. while pre-deployment training is directed by AFPPKOC. Still, PDT is structured according to U.N. standards and policies; learning materials are likewise provided. Mobile training support teams are also made available in order to help facilitate PDT.

Witnessing the trainings conducted by the U.N., the AFP is able to derive ideas on how to better conduct its own. U.N trainings are distinctively properly funded, allowing the peacekeepers to have the best kind of preparation for their mission as all the necessary logistics and other resources will be provided. Equipment used during peacekeeping missions are also made available and maximized, allowing peacekeepers to become highly familiar with the materiel they will use so that maximum adeptness and efficiency may be exercised during the actual course of the mission.

Peacekeeping is also an opportunity to pursue curriculum development of the AFP’s various schooling courses and programs. During the course of their mission, some Filipino peacekeepers are also tasked as instructors in various peacekeeping centers of the U.N. These schools have their own programs of instruction, necessary in order for peacekeepers to gain the specific capabilities required by the mission. Thus, instructors may gain an understanding why these programs are crafted the way they are in consideration of the security environment of the area, its political dynamics, and other relevant factors affecting the purpose and objectives of the mission. Similarity of experiences between the Philippines and the country, particularly the nature of internal security threats, in which a mission is located may lead to adoption of subjects that are also deemed best to be learned by AFP personnel.

Current efforts in pursuit of these are guided by the AFP Peace Support Operations (PSO) Roadmap 2020. First among its main development goals is to “enhance AFP capabilities for PSO mission deployment.” As such, the AFP consistently updates its training methodologies, participates in multilateral training exercises, and improves the training facilities of PKOC.

**Utilization of benefits gained**
The AFP has been able to utilize the benefits gained from U.N. peacekeeping participation through several means. Through the detailed experiences, lessons learned, and recommendations recorded in end-of-mission reports of peacekeepers, the AFP Peacekeeping Operations School is able to cull relevant inputs including tactical best practices and peacekeeping principles that are integrated.
in the school’s curriculum, enhancing the preparations undertaken by AFP personnel projected for deployment to a U.N peace operations mission.

Other AFP training programs, such as the Officer Candidate Course and the Sergeant Major Course, also incorporate peacekeeping principles in the curricula in cognizance of the thrust to implement a holistic and whole-of-nation approach in pursuing peace, and the complexity of responding to contemporary concerns, particularly the increasing onset of armed conflict in urban settings, a situation that exponentially increased the societal impact of existing security threats. AFP training schools request for instructors from AFPPKOC in order to effectively reinforce peacekeeping principles upon the students who will be able to effectively apply such in their AOR upon designation to their next unit.

It is given that the orientation of the armed forces is more on warfighting or destruction of the enemy. However, the need to inculcate the principles of peacekeeping has become increasingly prominent with the closer convergence of addressing internal security threats with effective local stakeholder engagement. With guidance from national thrusts, the AFP has taken steps to gradually cascade it to the soldiery through the help of peacekeepers.

Improved conduct of trainings is merely one of the manifestations of how participation in U.N. peace operations also serves as an avenue to pursue the modernization thrust of the AFP. In fact, this is the foremost reason top troop-contributing countries such as Nigeria\(^7\) and Bangladesh\(^8\) substantially invest manpower, logistics, and other resources in support to U.N. missions; these countries struggle financially, thus they take advantage of the opportunity to send their troops for learning through high standards of training under top instructors. Moreover, it allows the upgrade of military equipment through the U.N. Reimbursement Fund; Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) used by troops in U.N. missions, given its proper function and maintenance in compliance to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the contributing country and the U.N., will eventually be adequately reimbursed through the fund. Such equipment may be further utilized by the sending Member State once its deployment in a U.N. mission is finished.

**Upholding national security interests**

Significant in the AFP’s successful pursuit of its mandate is the sustainment of strong relations with other countries, particularly their armed forces. Participation in U.N peace operations is a prime opportunity to do so as Filipino troops are able to work on-the-ground with other countries’ military personnel for a prolonged

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\(^7\)William M. Wando, “Challenges, benefits, and recommendations for continued Nigerian peacekeeping,” 2012, Naval War College: Newport, RI.

period of time. This allows other Member States to witness first-hand the excellence and reliability of Philippine security forces as a partner country and as a fellow member of the U.N. In fact, Filipino peacekeepers are considered world-class and are highly favored by top officials of U.N. missions, giving international respect and prestige for the country.

Moreover, participation is an indicator that the Philippines is also ready to understand and take action on various issues of concern to international peacekeeping and security, expanding the common ground with other countries and facilitating practical thrusts of cooperation, such as policies, agreements, and exercises, mutually beneficial to all parties.

**Challenges and opportunities**

This endeavor is not exempt from challenges that hinder full maximization of the opportunity. Foremost of these is the decreased number of mission areas participated in; after the Golan Heights crisis when a U.N. peacekeeping outpost was sieged by Syrian rebels, and the outbreak of Ebola in Liberia in 2014, Filipino troops were pulled out from the areas’ missions, leaving Haiti as the sole U.N. mission area in which AFP troops are allowed to be deployed in. Primordial concern for the welfare and security of troops led to the repatriation. Nevertheless, given the end of the situation in Golan Heights, the declaration of Liberia by the World Health Organization as Ebola-free, and the numerous other U.N. mission areas that troops may be deployed in, current times are ideal in once again exploring and expanding the AFP’s scope of participation in U.N. peace operations.

Another is the protracted procurement process and release of funds for acquiring the equipment for U.N. deployment, even taking as much as two years. Aside from hindering the procurement of the adequate number and kind of materiel, it also affects the reimbursement allotted for COE already deployed. Reimbursement is issued upon inspection that COE are in good condition; otherwise, it will be only reimbursed by the time it is repaired during a subsequent rotation cycle of troops. If funds for repair of COE are not provided in time, UNRF is likewise delayed. Thus, considering that costs are reimbursed, it is ideal to take advantage of maintaining and upgrading the AFP’s equipment towards modernization.

Even with the risks and challenges, respondents of the study are in agreement that the Philippines should continue sending contingents to U.N. peace operations, the rationale being the country’s international commitment to pursue global peace which is rooted upon the constitutional mandate of renouncing war, and the benefits gained by the country, particularly the AFP, from participating.

**Recommendations**

Establishing the benefits gained from the endeavor, a more robust and active participation of the country in U.N. peace operations is urged. Upon his assumption as Chief of Staff of AFP, LTGEN REY LEONARDO B GUERRERO AFP spearheaded this pursuit by issuing the clear guidance to train and send readily deployable and highly capable contingents to U.N. missions:
“We will enhance the AFP’s UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness by shifting our training methodology from involving temporarily-formed units to deploying existing units of the AFP. We will rationalize our peacekeeping commitments so that future deployments will be more competency-based.”\textsuperscript{9}

Attention must also be directed to the subsequent assignment of peacekeepers after their stint in a U.N. mission. It is best to identify specific designations where their acquired capabilities will be maximized, such as serving as instructors of training schools or as heads of offices in their area of specialization, or as personnel in areas of operations where the application of peacekeeping principles is highly demanded. This is the initial step towards ensuring that peacekeepers are able to apply the skills and lessons learned from their respective U.N. missions. Considering that their next assignment is decided by their respective major service, the services must coordinate with AFPPKOC to determine where returning peacekeepers may be best assigned next. This will ideally pave the way for an established system of assignment that recognizes and fully utilizes the unique experiences and lessons learned gained from U.N. peace operations.

Respondents of the study also particularly identified that the government needs to be more aware of the need to maximize the U.N. Reimbursement Fund in modernizing the AFP’s equipment. Cash-out is required for contingent-owned equipment, but the return of investment is far more significant, allowing equipment upgrades at minimal cost while signifying resolve in fulfilling the Philippines’ commitments to international peacekeeping.

The National Council for United Nations Peace Operations (NCUNPO), tasked to provide policy direction to Philippine participation in U.N. peace operations, is likewise continuously doing its part in promoting further participation by engaging the President in relevant discussions and decisions. It is an inter-agency council composed of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of National Defense, and Department of Interior and Local Government supported by an Executive Committee with the AFP and Philippine National Police as members. During the previous administration, the council, chaired by DFA, determined for the President to revisit his decision to reduce the Philippines’ participation was reduced to one mission area only, Haiti. Though this has yet to be reversed, prospects remain positive with the AFP’s clear thrust and the support of relevant institutions through NCUNPO.

**Conclusion**

Participating in U.N. peace operations is indeed a prime avenue in strengthening the AFP as an organization. From tactical to the strategic level, the endeavor proves beneficial in enhancing individual capacities, introducing organizational best practices, and ultimately supporting national security interests. AFP personnel sent as peacekeepers are able to hone specialized

\textsuperscript{9}Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero, “Command Guidance,” 26 October 2017, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
military skills and also the ability to confidently interact and establish amiable relations with the local people. The AFP likewise learns from the U.N. itself in terms of better conducting trainings and schooling courses through world-class learning structures, proper funding, and curriculum development. These ultimately contribute to upholding national interest as the Philippines gains international respect and prestige which translate to policies, agreements, and exercises with other countries that further enhance the capabilities of the AFP in pursuing its mandate of protection of the people and the State.

The AFP, supported by the initiatives of other security sector institutions through the NCUNPO, clearly exerts much effort in promoting further participation in U.N. peace operations. However, the endeavor has not been fully maximized due to inadequate awareness of the merits of the endeavor, and sufficient mechanisms enabling it. Nevertheless, with the clear guidance issued by CSAFP on U.N. peace operations and the esteem accorded by the incumbent Chief Executive to the AFP, there is reason to remain positive that appreciation for the endeavor will be promoted, allowing full utilization, and eventually institutionalization, of the benefits gained by the AFP in order to strengthen the organization.

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determination to move in and win now. A mindset, fueled not by anxiety and contentment, but by the sheer fact and the solid belief that anything is possible through urgency.

One of the world’s leading pioneer and “foremost” authority John P. Kotter’s book A Sense of Urgency revolved around this very mentality where immediate action is deemed necessary, in almost aspects. Through constant, and can also be considered relentless mentioning of what really true urgency means, he was able to convince every reader its essence and relevance to a changing dynamics of the world. It is in this book that one will realize that their habits of being content on the status quo and celebratory on every success leads to a negative mentality called complacency.
Kotter made a good argument on how this mentality of contentment and slowing down after a huge milestone add to the factors on why organizations and businesses don’t achieve their long term vision. He provided real-life situations wherein complacency, if made a convention, can degrade the performance not only by an individual, but also the organization as a whole.

Kotter’s mission on the book was clear: that true urgency is essentially needed in almost every aspect of our lives. His persistence on the need for a sense of urgency can transcend to readers, and inspire them to act, move and win now. On the course of reading the book, it is noticeable that each chapter is a prelude to the next one, and each one provides context and clarity on the key message. A reader may feel that he/she attends a college seminar because of the delivery of the subject matter. He first provided a concise and simple definition of the key message, and presented a burning and compelling case of neglecting “urgency”. The way on how one organization, or a person can achieve true urgency are properly laid out by Kotter. Details of each step are provided, and he even complemented it real-life examples delivered in a very convincing manner. Overall, the tone of the author expresses his dedication and sincerity in the subject matter.

Building up a true sense of urgency

Increasing a true sense of urgency is often considered a challenge in any organizations. Considering its rarity among various range and classes of people, a true sense of urgency must be created and recreated, which can be practiced through four tactics, as enumerated by John Kotter. He used business cases as examples on how a heightened sense of urgency is very crucial in determining the outcomes of their decision-making. He also made a convincing statement that relevant information that has a direct impact to an organization needs to be communicated to the heart of the employees or personnel. Through this, he said that one will develop a heightened sense of urgency if the message has an effect in their emotions, triggering the mentality of determination, and to win now. Furthermore, messages that targets the abstract affective states of people, or in the book’s terminology the heart, transcends through their long-term decision-making and behavior. Feelings of gratitude, warmth, trust and hope are examples of abstract affective states wherein if triggered by appropriate messages, sparks a feeling of action, which eventually lead to a sense of true urgency.

Complacency

Complacency and a false sense of urgency are the two things that Kotter is very critical about. According to him, complacency is more of a feeling, rather than a mentality. It is a feeling of contentment to one’s present situation, and abide to the processes of a status quo. To give more context, he provided the mentality and behavior of complacents: 1) they have positive predisposition on their actions which means they think that they are doing the right thing even if they are not; and 2) also complacent ones rejects change, and afraid to its consequences.
Four Tactics in Increasing Urgency

Being an authority of change, Kotter enumerated 4 tactics in creating a true sense of urgency. These tactics, if properly executed, will arise a true sense of urgency which is really needed in an ever changing environment we live on. The Philippine Army can draw inspiration from the following, considering they always operate in an environment with continuous change and dynamics. Whether be it in terms of combat operations or strategy management, these tactics apply which are crucial if we are to achieve our 2028 vision.

Tactic 1: bring the outside in

Any organization or corporation has pride in being the best on what they do. These victories may be caused by well-formulated plans and strategies, with corresponding good executions. However, through these successes, one becomes internally focused, not minding the current external situation and weather. John Kotter emphasized how this mentality leads to complacency of dangerous levels. The first tactic explores the ways on how to eliminate the mentality of being too internally focused. This tactic entails reducing the gap between the outside and inside. According to Kotter, the gap can be reduced by retrieving and utilizing information on the outside. It is a common problem in different organizations that they assess and evaluate themselves, using means also developed by themselves.

Kotter highlighted that information outside the organization, whether may be it a criticism or low evaluation scores from external auditors. Instead of perceiving them negatively, Kotter highly encouraged to look at them as opportunities for improvement, and basis for strategy reviews. In this way, one can validate the accuracy of these outside information, and also a proof of the invalidity of external critics. These information can be retrieved by sending people out and having them experience first-hand what people from the outside are saying to their organization. With people from outside going out, bringing people in, whom also have the right information and credibility, gives an identical advantage on organizations seeking improvement and endless opportunities for development.

Tactic 2: behave with urgency everyday

In order to acquire a habit, multiple and constant and repeated effort is necessary. Not only the continuity and consistency of action, but also the attitude of the involved must be taken into account. According to a study published in the European Journal of Psychology, it takes approximately 18 to 254 days before a habit is formed, taking into account factors like personalities, predisposition, and situation. The same goes with creating a habit of a sense of urgency, which really requires time and patience in order to be fully embedded in an organization or a system.

Tactic 3: Find opportunity in crises

The journey to transformation is an arduous one. Well-crafted strategies often do not go as planned. Crises may always arise in any step of the way, and into the most unexpected manner. Our disposition and attitude will tell if we will accept this as a problem, or as an exciting opportunity to explore beyond our comfort zones. This concept of finding opportunity in crises can be considered
as one of the most relevant tactic in increasing urgency and decreasing complacency. It offers a different and refreshing perspective on how to deal with crises which can disrupt the systems but also hurt people in certain aspects. Kotter explored the different ways on how a crises can become a Trojan Horse, a sign of victory or an unexpected disaster.

**Tactic 4: deal with NoNos**

Assuming that all people in an organization has the same fiery sense of urgency and all is determined to win now, transformation should be easy. It is an ideal scenario that every top executive leaders aspire. Not only it makes everyone’s job easier, a heightened sense of urgency present in everyone takes an organization closer to their full potential.

Calling them NoNos, Kotter warned that these are dangerous individuals. They are urgency killers in an organization must be purged and ignored. They reinforce anxiety and contentment among other members of an organization, causing the delay of an immediate action. On the other hand, NoNos are different than skeptics he argued. Skeptics don’t possess the negativity a NoNo has. They may be slow in action and critical when exposed to possible opportunities but when proven wrong, skeptics can be initiators. Unlike a NoNo where they do the best they can to completely close the doors for opportunities, which kill the invaluable sense of urgency in an organization.

**Conclusion**

The importance of having a sense of urgency cannot be neglected, especially in a world where the only permanent thing is change. Overall, the book was able to properly emphasize that urgency is a matter of creating the right culture, one that is relentless and persistent. With proper understanding of its definition and limitations, urgency can be a pressing force that expands our horizons towards opportunities. In order for it to be an effective driver of change, it needs to be communicated using experiences that targets the emotional senses of people, rather than their rational thoughts.

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